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Dear	Rector	and	Members	of	the	University	Board,	dear	Dean	of	the	Faculty	of	Arts,	 Your	 Excellency	 the	 Ambassador	 of	 Japan,	 distinguished	 guests,	colleagues,	students,	ladies	and	gentlemen,		Today,	 first	 of	 all,	 I	will	 take	 you	 to	 the	 very	 gloomy	and	dark	world	of	 the	novel	 1984,	written	 by	 Eric	 Arthur	 Blair,	 who	 you	 all	 know	 of	 course	 as	George	Orwell.	He	wrote	this	novel	between	May	1946	and	December	1948,	and	published	it	on	8th	June	1949,	half	a	year	before	he	died	of	tuberculosis.		
	
1984	was	 an	 immediate	 success,	 and	became	highly	 influential.	 Expressions	such	as	 ‘thought	police’,	 ‘thought	 crime’,	 ‘doublethink’,	 ‘newspeak’,	 ‘memory	hole’,	 and	of	 course	 ‘Big	Brother’	have	entered	 the	English	 language,	 just	 as	the	adverb	‘Orwellian’	has	come	to	signify	something	sinister.1	1984	has	been	filmed	 twice,	 translated	 into	 some	 65	 languages,	 and	 has	 sold	 millions	 of	copies	worldwide.			I	 first	 read	 1984	 when	 I	 was	 about	 16	 years	 old,	 and	 it	 made	 a	 huge	impression	on	me.	Orwell’s	dystopia	about	a	world	where	there	is	no	escape	from	 Big	 Brother	 and	 where	 people	 are	 taught	 to	 live	 only	 in	 the	 present,	since	only	 the	present	matters,	was	 to	me	primarily	a	warning	about	where	totalitarian	regimes	might	lead	to.			It	was	scary	indeed;	yet	the	idea	that	actual	history	was	being	constantly	re-written	in	order	to	match	the	current	circumstances	situation	(as	you	can	see	in	the	 following	quote:	 ‘Oceania	was	at	war	with	Eurasia.	Therefore	Oceania	had	 always	 been	 at	war	with	 Eurasia’),	 that	 part	 did	 not	 strike	me	 as	 very	realistic.	It	was	very	crucial	and	fitting	in	the	context	of	the	novel,	but	indeed	it	was	 fiction.	 The	 notion	 that	 you	 could	 actually	 stop	 people	 remembering	things,	that	memory	could	be	controlled,	sounded	simply	too	bad	to	be	true.			How	little	did	I	know.		Today,	as	in	1949	when	Orwell	published	his	novel,	his	shadow	is	all	over	the	place,	especially	in	regard	to	the	use	and	misuse	of	history.	This	is	the	case	in	present-day	 East-Asia,	 as	 shown	 for	 example	 in	 the	 Chinese-Japanese	tensions,	 and	 in	 Europe,	 which	 is	 confronted	with	 economic	 distress	 and	 a	crisis	situation	regarding	refugees	and	displaced	persons.			These	 two	 regions	 are	not	mentioned	by	 accident:	 in	my	professional	 life,	 I	divide	 my	 attention	 between	 Europe	 and	 East-Asia,	 particularly	 Japan.	 As	Director	of	 Studies,	 I	 am	 responsible	 for	 the	 International	Erasmus	mundus	Master	 Programme	 Euroculture,	 and	 the	 track	 East	 Asian	 Studies	 in	 the	Master	 International	Relations.	Furthermore,	 I	am	Director	of	 the	Centre	 for	Japan	Studies	in	Groningen.	This	lecture	reflects	both	regions.	Although	quite	diverse,	 there	 are	 also	 striking	 similarities	 in	 the	 role	 history	 plays	 in	 both	Europe	and	Asia	at	present.		One	of	the	best-known	quotes	about	the	role	of	the	past	in	Orwell’s	1984	goes	as	 follows:	 ‘Who	 controls	 the	 past,	 controls	 the	 future:	 who	 controls	 the	present,	controls	the	past.	(…)	All	that	was	needed	was	an	unending	series	of	
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victories	 over	 your	 own	 memory’.2	And	 indeed,	 the	 protagonist	 Winston	Smith	works	in	the	Ministry	of	Truth,	where	he	constantly	revises	the	past	in	order	to	stay	in	line	with	the	present.			Last	year,	in	August	2015,	when	the	70th	anniversary	of	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	 in	 Asia	 was	 commemorated,	The	Economist	 directly	 referred	 to	this	quote	on	 its	cover:	 ‘Xi’s	history	 lessons:	How	China	rewrites	 the	past	 to	control	 the	 future’.3	The	 print	 edition	 opened	 its	 leaders	 section	 –	 in	 other	words,	 it	 considered	 this	 item	 the	 most	 important	 that	 week	 –	 with	 the	following	blunt	clarification	regarding	these	history	lessons:	‘The	Communist	Party	is	plundering	history	to	justify	its	present	day	ambitions’.4	All	in	all,	no	less	than	ten	pages	were	dedicated	to	history	matters	in	Asia	in	this	issue.			While	 also	 –	 in	 all	 fairness	 –	 referring	 to	 the	 ambivalent	discussions	on	 the	past	 in	 Japan,	 the	 editorial	 uttered	 sharp	 criticism	 on	 firstly,	 the	 Chinese	distortions	of	history,	secondly,	the	peril	of	the	first	Chinese	commemoration	of	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	by	means	of	a	huge	military	parade,	and	thirdly,	 the	 beating	 of	 the	 drum	 of	 nationalism	 by	 issuing	 continuous	warnings	 in	schools,	museums	and	TV	programmes	that	 Japan	was	not	only	an	 aggressive	 power	 in	 the	 past,	 but	 that	 it	 could	 menace	 Asia	 again.	 The	conclusion	was	that	these	issues	constituted	a	grave	danger	for	stability	in	the	region.			
The	Economist	also	pointed	to	the	possibility	that	nationalist	agitation	might	affect	 internal	stability:	once	 the	genie	has	escaped	 from	the	bottle,	 it	 is	not	easy	 to	 put	 it	 back	 again.	 That	 nationalist	 agitation	 can	 be	 a	 double-edged	sword	 is	 a	 lesson	 the	 Chinese	 know	 from	 historic	 experience.	 Nationalist	demonstrations	are	indeed	a	potential	risk	of	the	government,	since	they	can	turn	 into	 a	 platform	 for	 uttering	 other	 complaints	 and	 objections.	 National	and	local	authorities	are	well	aware	of	that:	a	recent	analysis	of	anti-Japanese	protests	that	took	place	in	Chinese	cities	in	2012	shows	that	local	authorities	were	 less	 inclined	 to	 allow	 nationalist	 demonstrations	 in	 cities	 with	 many	unemployed	 college	 graduates	 and	 ethnic	minorities,	 in	 other	words	where	there	existed	the	potential	risk	of	social	unrest.5	
 	Yet	the	past	has	also	shown	that	domestic	protests	can	be	very	effective	for	executing	international	leverage.	The	2005	protests	triggered	by	the	Japanese	state	 approval	 of	 a	 controversial	 revisionist	history	 textbook,	 as	well	 as	 the	bid	of	Japan,	together	with	three	other	countries,	to	gain	a	permanent	seat	at	the	UN	Security	Council,	are	a	case	in	point.6			Already	 in	 the	1980s,	 Japan	had	become	an	 ‘easy	 target’	 of	 the	nationalistic	policies	 of	 China,	 when	 sharp	 criticism	 was	 expressed	 on	 Japanese	 history	textbooks	 and	 on	 visits	 by	 high-ranking	 Japanese	 politicians	 to	 Yasukuni	shrine	 in	 Tokyo	 –	 where	 the	 spirits	 are	 enshrined	 of	 those	 who	 fought	 on	behalf	of	 the	Emperor.7	That	 the	great	bulk	of	 Japanese	history	 textbooks	 in	high	 schools	 in	 fact	 offer	 a	 rather	 dry	 account	 of	 the	 historic	 facts,	 and	 are	relatively	 ‘light	 on	 patriotism’	 –	 which	 is	 precisely	 why	 the	 nationalistic	
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So	I	am	in	excellent	company	when	I	argue	that	historians,	instead	of	being	an	extension	 of	 the	 state	 or	 nation,	 not	 only	 ought	 to	 keep	 their	 distance,	 but	what’s	more,	play	 the	 role	of	what	 cultural	historian	Peter	Burke	has	nicely	called	 the	 ‘remembrancer’,	 a	word	 that	was	used	 as	 a	 euphemism	 for	debt-collector,	who	kindly	‘reminded’	people	of	debt	they	might	have	forgotten.			It	 is	this	topic	that	I	will	elaborate	on	further	in	this	lecture,	comparing	how	the	 role	 of	 ‘remembrancer’	might	 have	 and	 indeed	 has	worked	 out	 in	 East	Asia,	particularly	 in	 Japan,	and	in	Europe.	And	furthermore,	how	the	Second	World	War,	Cold	War,	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War	shaped	post-war	identity.		
	Peter	 Burke,	 to	 be	 fair,	 did	 not	 refer	 to	 national	 history.	 He	 signified	 the	function	 of	 the	 historian	 in	 general	 as	 a	 custodian	 of	 the	 social	memory	of	certain	 deeds	 and	 events.	 Very	 instructive	 indeed,	 not	 only	 to	 see	 what	 is	remembered,	but,	perhaps	even	more	importantly,	to	observe	what	is	left	out,	suppressed,	excluded.	Historians,	 in	his	opinion,	 should	be	 the	 ‘guardians	of	awkward	facts,	the	skeletons	in	the	cupboard	of	the	social	memory’.12			I	 should	make	 clear	what	 I	 have	 in	mind	when	using	 the	 term	nationalism,	presented	 in	 the	 title	of	 this	 lecture	as	 rather	problematic,	 and	 in	need	of	a		neutralizing	 antidote.	 Nationalism	 can	 of	 course	 be	 perceived	 in	 different	ways.	 One	 form	 is	 that	 of	 a	 shared,	 ‘imagined	 political	 community’,	 as	 the	well-known	definition	of	 historian	 and	political	 scientist	Benedict	Anderson	points	 out.13	Nationalism	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 exclusionary.	 In	 what	 is	 also	called	 ‘liberal	 nationalism’,	 identification	 with	 ‘a	 plurality	 of	 cultures	 and	communities’	 can	 be	 a	 feature.	 Modern	 liberal	 nationalism,	 as	 defined	 by	political	 scientist	 David	 Miller,	 allows	 for	 multicultural	 diversity	 within	 a	society,	an	inclusive	identity	‘accessible	to	members	of	all	cultural	groups’.14	It	is	 nationalism	 in	 its	 exclusionary	 form	 that	 is	 potentially	 harmful	 for	 peace	and	stability.	 	In	my	view,	 the	role	of	historians	 is	not	primarily	 to	 identify	 the	 ‘villains’	 in	history,	 and	 certainly	 they	 should	 avoid	 using	 an	 anachronistic	 framework.	The	duty	of	historians	is	rather	to	understand,	interpret,	and	analyse	the	past	critically.	 This	 critical	 investigation	 should	 be	 nuanced	 and	 balanced,	 but	should	not	take	into	account	what	effects	research	might	have	on	the	image	of	a	given	country.	Historians	are	not	politicians.			I	would	like	to	 illustrate	this	point	with	an	example	from	close	to	home:	the	investigation	of	the	policy	regarding	war	crimes	committed	by	Dutch	soldiers	in	 Indonesia	 during	 the	 Indonesian	 war	 of	 independence,	 and	 the	 Dutch	public	discussion	about	it.	The	first	national	debate	about	this	started	in	1969,	when	 the	 revelations	 and	 accusations	 of	 whistle	 blower	 Joop	 Hueting	 on	Dutch	national	 television	came	as	a	 shock.	 	The	psychologist	Hueting	–	who	was	drafted	to	 fight	 in	 Indonesia	when	he	was	19	years	old	–	told	of	crimes	that	had	been	committed	by	the	Dutch	troops	in	pursuing	their	task	to	restore	‘peace	 and	 order’.	 These	 acts	 had	 not	 been	 mere	 incidents,	 but	 had	 been	committed	 on	 a	 large	 scale.15	It	 was	 much	 easier	 to	 talk	 about	 war	 crimes	committed	 by	 the	 French	 in	 Algeria,	 Germans	 in	 Europe,	 and	 Americans	 in	
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Vietnam,	than	to	 look	at	what	one’s	own	troops	had	done,	Hueting	said,	and	yet	it	was	necessary	that	‘a	civilised	nation’	came	to	terms	with	this	past	and	corrected	the	far	too	positive	image	of	the	way	the	war	in	Indonesia	had	been	fought.16				In	 itself,	 this	 need	not	 have	been	 such	 an	 eye-opener.	 	 Already	 in	 the	 years	1946-1949	there	had	been	discussion	in	parliament	and	the	left-wing	press	in	particular	 about	 violence	 committed	 by	 Dutch	 soldiers,	 and	 in	 1949	 the	government	 did	 acknowledge	 that	 ‘some’	 excesses	 had	 taken	 place,	 in	particular	in	South	Celebes	(now:	Sulawesi),	and	ordered	an	investigation	into	these	matters.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	played	down	the	number	of	misdeeds	 and	 warned	 against	 thinking	 that	 this	 in	 any	 sense	 had	 been	standard	procedure.17	The	impact	on	the	general	public,	also	from	the	stream	of	 publications	 in	 left	 wing	 news	media	 after	 that,	 was	 rather	 limited.	 The	uppermost	 sentiment	 was	 that	 the	 Dutch	 had	 been	 victims	 in	 and	 of	 the	Second	World	War,	and	there	was	less	space	and	understanding	for	criticism	of	Dutch	warfare,	and	certainly	less	interest	in	general	for	what	had	happened	in	the	East.18			In	 that	 respect,	 it	 was	 amazing	 that	 the	 public	 reaction	 to	 a	 current	 affairs	programme,	Achter	het	Nieuws	(Behind	the	News)	by	the	VARA,	a	left-leaning	broadcast	 association,	 was	 so	 different.	 It	 immediately	 triggered	 reactions	and	 debate,	 showing	 what	 influence	 this	 medium	 had,	 especially	 at	 a	 time	when	 there	were	only	 two	Dutch	 television	channels.19	Eight	days	 	 later	 the	news	 programme	 presented	 a	 follow-up,	with	 interviews	 of	 other	 veterans,	and	a	third	broadcast	a	few	days	after	that	with	a	panel	discussion	about	the	political	 background	 and	possible	 further	 steps.	One	of	 the	panellists	was	 a	political	novice:	Hans	van	Mierlo.	He	was	the	leader	of	a	newly	founded	party,	D’66,	and	said	that	taking	the	perpetrators	to	court	was	not	the	primary	aim	–	first	 and	 foremost	 it	 was	 important	 that	 the	 Dutch	 people	 confronted	 this	past.	 	 However,	 the	 possibility	 should	 also	 not	 be	 excluded	 either,	 as	otherwise	 it	 did	not	make	any	 sense	 to	 ask	 ‘our	neigbours’	 to	 sanitise	 their	past.20			Already	 on	24th	 January,	 the	 social-democrat	 J.M.	 den	Uyl	 had	 requested	 an	inquiry	 in	 parliament.	 The	 prime	 minister,	 P.	 de	 Jong,	 ordered	 an	 official	investigation	into	the	information	that	was	available	in	the	official	archives;	in	the	 report,	 which	was	 already	 published	 in	 June,	 the	 acts	 of	 violence	 were	listed	 as	 incidents,	 or	 ‘Excesses’.	 The	 word	 ‘war	 crime’	 was	 avoided	 at	 the	specific	request	of	the	prime	minister,	fearing	for	an	emotional	comparison	to	what	Germans	and	Japanese	had	done	during	the	Second	World	War.	He	also		wanted	 to	 prevent	 the	 question	 of	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 people	 who	 were	responsible	 for	 these	war	crimes	had	been	punished.21	A	year	 later,	 the	 first	substantive	 study	 on	 the	 colonial	 violence	 was	 published,	 which	 is	 still	considered	as	a		key	reference	today.22		Two	decades	later,	a	similar	discussion	took	place.	This	time	it	was	because	of	the	way	L.	de	Jong,	at	that	time	without	doubt	the	best-known	historian	in	the	Netherlands,	had	used	the	word	‘war	crimes’	in	the	manuscript	of	volume	12	
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of	Het	Koninkrijk	der	Nederlanden	in	de	Tweede	Wereldoorlog	(the	Kingdom	
of	 the	 Netherlands	 during	 World	 War	 Two).	 Some	members	 of	 the	 reading	committee	strongly	advised	against	 that	usage,	while	others	were	 in	 favour.	One	 reviewer,	 ‘a	 former	 army	 officer,	 even	 took	 the	 unprecedented	 step	 of	leaking	 the	 text	 to	a	 conservative	newspaper,	De	Telegraaf	 (The	Telegraph),	that	 had	 already	 been	 very	 vocal	 in	 defending	 ‘the’	 veterans.	 This	 caused	strong	public	reactions	and	public	debate;	the	final	text	would	eventually	read	‘excesses’	 instead	 of	 ‘war	 crimes’.23		 De	 Jong	 had	 already	 been	 severely	criticised,	and	had	even	been	taken	to	court	by	a	committee	with	the	telling	name	 of	 Comité	 Geschiedkundig	 eerherstel	 Nederlands-Indië	 (Historical	Rehabilitation	 Netherlands	 Indies),	 because	 it	 disagreed	 with	 the	 way	 he	wrote	 about	 the	Dutch	 colonial	presence	 in	 the	Netherlands	 Indies	 (volume	11a).24			Even	 though	 the	 end	 of	 colonial	 rule	 in	 Indonesia	 became	 a	 sensitive,	 even	traumatic	 period	 in	Dutch	 history	 –	 as	would	 again	 be	 clear	 in	 1995,	when	Queen	Beatrix	accepted	an	invitation	from	President	Suharto	for	a	State	Visit,	and	 the	 issue	of	 formal	apologies	was	 raised	 in	 the	Netherlands	–	gradually	there	was	more	space	for	recognition	that	indeed	the	warfare	had	been	‘dirty’,	and	 the	 Dutch	 had	 not	 always	 belonged	 to	 the	 ‘good	 guys’.	 This	 became	evident	in	2011,	when	a	court	ruled	that	the	surviving	relatives	of	men	killed	in	 a	mass	 execution	 in	 a	 village	 in	West	 Java,	 Rawagedeh,	 were	 to	 be	 paid	money	 as	 compensation.25	A	 little	 over	 a	 year	 later,	 the	 taboo	 on	 making	formal	apologies	was	broken,	when	a	formal	apology	was	issued	by	Tjeerd	de	Zwaan,	 the	Dutch	ambassador	 in	 Indonesia.26	However,	 in	2005,	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	B.R.	Bot	had	already	recognised,	both	in	the	Netherlands	and	in	Indonesia,	that	the	Netherlands	had	been	‘on	the	wrong	side’	of	history.		Still,	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 acts	 of	 excessive	 violence	 could	 not	 simply	 be	described	 as	 incidents	 that	 took	 place	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 so-called	‘Politionele	Acties’	(itself	a	euphemism	for	war)	in	the	years	1947	and	1949,	but	belonged	to	the	very	structure	of	the	war,	made	the	front	pages	again	in	2015.27	Historian	 René	 Limpach	 gave	 the	Dutch	 regime	 the	 label	 of	 ‘violent	police	state’.	No	more,	no	less.	Not	a	pleasant	message,	but	it	is	important	that	these	facts	are	faced.	Limpach	acted	-	once	again	-	as	a	remembrancer.28			At	the	same	time,	we	have	to	acknowledge	that	these	facts	do	not	necessarily	comply	with	 the	memories	of	 the	different	people	 involved.	 It	seems,	as	was	stated	 in	a	background	article	 in	NRC	Handelsblad,	as	 if	 everyone	has	his	or	her	 own	 memory	 of	 the	 final	 years	 of	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 presence	 in	Indonesia.29	What	can	be	digested	from	the	above	is	that	it	is	important	to	seek	for:			1.	Understanding	on	how	power	relations	influence	views	and	perceptions	of	the	past,	and	 in	particular	how	the	past	 is	used	as	a	political	 tool	and	–	as	a	response;			2.	A	nuanced	 interpretation,	 taking	 into	account	various	perspectives	on	an	issue,	and	aspire	for	what	professor	of	Japanese	history	Tessa	Morris-Suzuki	has	called	 ‘historical	 truthfulness’.	There	may	never	be	a	complete,	 let	alone	
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fully	objective	and	fully	correct	representation	of	the	past,	but	to	strive	for	a	nuanced	 and	 balanced	 view	 is	 certainly	 possible	 and	 necessary.30	It	 is	 here	that	the	historian	should	blow	the	trumpet.		In	 the	 following	part,	 I	will	 discuss	 further	 how	and	why	 the	 history	 of	 the	Second	World	War	still	plays	a	very	important	role	both	in	Europe	and	in	East	Asia,	and	how	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	influenced	international	and	national	politics	and	the	perception	of	the	past.	Before	I	do	so,	I	would	like	to	delve	a	little	deeper	into	the	relation	between	history	and	memory.			While	memory	 is	 imbedded	 in	 the	present,	historical	understanding,	 though	itself	historically	positioned	in	time,	concerns	the	past.	There	is	no	agreement	amongst	 historians	 as	 to	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 past	and	memory.	The	past	 should	be	 separated	as	an	object	of	knowledge	 from	the	present,	yet	the	past	is	a	kind	of	mould	that	influences	and	connects	to	the	present.31		Memory	can	result	in	a	feeling	of	rupture	with	the	past,	and	different	groups	in	society	can	have	conflicting	memories,	depending	on	group,	class,	gender,	or	social	position.	Because	of	the	great	many	studies	of	memory,	the	idea	that	the	past	 itself	 is	 flexible	and	subject	to	change	gains	 increasing	ground.	 ‘The	past	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 longer	 written	 in	 granite	 but	 rather	 in	 water.	 It	 is	continually	 reclaimed	 for	 power	 and	 identity	 politics’,	 writes	 professor	 of	English	 literature	 and	 renowned	 specialist	 on	 cultural	 memory,	 Aleida	Assmann.32		The	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 significantly	 changed	 domestic	 politics	 and	international	relations	in	Europe	and	in	Asia.	It	sparked	what	is	often	called	a	‘memory	boom’,	a	host	of	new	studies	on	the	role	of	memory,	and	this	added	‘a	new	layer	of	meaning’	to	the	past.33Memory	studies	have	developed	into	a	vibrant	 interdisciplinary	 research	 field,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 war,	reconciliation,	 the	Holocaust,	 and	 general	 historical	 injustices.	 It	 has	 almost	become	a	matter	of	adding	more	of	the	same	thing:	‘we	add	yet	another	site	of	memory,	we	address	yet	another	historical	injustice.’34		Let	us	return	to	the	perception	of	the	history	of	the	Second	World	War.	When	comparing	the	role	that	the	experience	of	this	war	had	in	Europe	and	in	Asia,	large	 differences	 come	 to	 the	 fore,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 Germany	 and	Japan.	Both	countries	were	confronted	with	an	allied	occupation,	which	in	the	case	of	 Japan	almost	 fully	 consisted	of	Americans,	who	came	 to	 the	 country	with	 the	 idea	 to	 transform	 it	 into	 an	 American-style	 democracy	 as	 soon	 as	possible.			Education	as	a	means	to	foster	democracy	was	thought	important:	already	in	1945,	a	practice	started	that	was	called	Suminuru:	blackening	–	literally,	with	the	help	of	black	ink	and	paintbrush	–	all	pages	and	sentences	in	schoolbooks	that	 were	 deemed	 to	 have	 a	 militaristic,	 nationalistic	 or	 undemocratic	character.	This	blackening	practice	started	before	the	Americans	even	set	foot	in	Japan,	and	was	initiated	by	the	Japanese	government.	In	his	important	book	
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Embracing	 Defeat,	 John	 W.	 Dower	 describes	 this	 process	 in	 terms	 of	‘simultaneously	 a	 ritual	 exorcism	of	 teachings	 that	had	only	yesterday	been	deemed	 sacrosanct	 and	 a	 practical	 exercise	 in	 encouraging	 criticism	 of	received	wisdom’.35	It	had	a	huge	impact	on	the	children.			New	classroom	 textbooks	with	 titles	 such	as	Democracy	reader	for	boys	and	
girls	–	Shōnen	shōjo	no	tame	no	minshu	Tokuhon	 –	 appeared	 in	1946,	 telling	the	children	that	even	without	the	Allied	occupation,	democracy	still	ought	to	be	 introduced	 because:	 ‘If	 we	 look	 at	 the	 history	 of	 mankind,	 to	 become	 a	democratic	 nation	 and	 democratic	 people	 is	 true	 to	 the	way	 people	 should	be’.36	The	 Americans	 took	 pains	 to	 introduce	 their	 reforms,	 such	 as	 the	introduction	of	a	new	constitution,	as	 Japanese,	and	presented	their	policies	as	 a	 continuation	of	 the	democratic	 reforms	 that	 had	 already	 started	 in	 the	1920s,	but	had	gone	astray	in	the	1930s	and	1940s	because	of	a	small	group	of	military	leaders.	Censorship	involved	many	topics;	for	instance,	criticism	of	the	 Supreme	 Commander	 for	 the	 Allied	 Powers	 (SCAP	 –	 the	 occupation	government),	 China,	 Korea,	 the	 US	 or	 Russia	 was	 not	 allowed,	 nor	 were	pictures	or	reports	of	the	effects	of	the	nuclear	bombs.	Framing	the	war	in	the	narrative	 of	 good	 versus	 bad	 made	 criticism	 of	 the	 firebombs	 and	 nuclear	bombs	a	difficult	matter	anyhow.37		The	 influence	 of	 the	US	 remained	 large,	 even	 after	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 peace	treaty	in	1952.	The	focus	on	continuity	might	have	legitimised	the	occupation,	but	implied	that	there	was	less	interest	in	what	had	actually	led	to	the	war,	or	in	whose	responsibility	it	was,	other	than	that	of	the	state	and	the	military.			Therefore	it	 is	a	definite	understatement	to	say	that	the	war	–	which	in	Asia	did	not	start	in	1939,	but	already	in	1931	–	is	still	a	very	contested	and	much	debated	 issue.	While	 the	 Chinese	 in	 particular	 use	 this	 topic	 to	 strengthen	their	 present-day	 nationalism,	 nationalist	 Japanese,	 including	 historians,	 do	the	same	by	arguing	that	 the	rhetoric	of	 the	war	years	was	sincere,	 that	 the	criticism	by	Western	voices,	 in	particular	the	Americans,	 is	hypocritical,	and	that	the	war	dead	ought	to	be	mourned	as	departed	heroes,	eirei.38			Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 nationalist	 point	 of	 view	 is	 highly	 controversial	within	Japan	itself.	The	Japanese	nation’s	memory	of	war,	and	in	particular	of	defeat,	has	thus	been	called	a	 ‘conflictive	and	polyphonic	public	discourse’.39	Although	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 that	 conflicting	 opinions	 exist	 within	 nations	 in	regard	 to	 war	 memory,	 the	 Japanese	 discourse	 is	 particularly	 strongly	fragmented,	with	marked	differences	within	 the	political	spectrum.	While	 in	China	the	war	history	is	used	as	a	tool	to	unite	the	population,	in	Japan	it	has	become	 ‘an	 issue	of	national	division’.40	Therefore	 the	war	 is	anything	but	a	past	 issue,	 but	 remains	 in	 ‘living	 memory’.	 What	 is	 more,	 core	 symbols	 of	Japanese	 nationhood,	 such	 as	 the	 flag	 and	 the	 emperor,	 are	 related	 to	interpretations	of	Japan’s	past	and	identity.41			In	 the	 1990s,	 there	 were	 already	 more	 than	 a	 hundred	 museums	 and	exhibition	 sites	 concerned	 with	 war	 defeat	 or	 world	 peace	 in	 Japan. 42	Together,	 these	represent	a	very	conservative	and	nationalist	vision,	next	 to	
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more	moderate	and	leftist	views	on	what	the	true	or	correct	story	is.		Recent	national	museums	in	China	on	war	offer	a	more	unison	view;	the	idea	is	to	educate	the	people	about	Japanese	atrocities,	with	the	explicit	purpose	of	to	strengthening	patriotic,	nationalist	feelings.		Nonetheless,	a	historic	perspective	on	this	rise	of	Chinese	nationalism	with	a	focus	on	Japanese	war	deeds	shows	it	is	a	relatively	new	phenomenon.	While	Nanjing	 now	 looms	 large	 in	 the	 Chinese	 nationalist	 discourse,	 the	 violent	capturing	of	this	city	did	not	play	such	a	huge	role	during	Mao’s	time,	firstly	because	 Nanjing	 was	 the	 Nationalist	 capital	 and	 communists	 were	 not	involved,	and	secondly	because	he	did	not	want	to	dwell	on	defeat.	Or	in	the	words	of	Ian	Buruma:	 ‘Mao’s	regime	was	interested	in	heroic	narratives,	not	martyrology’.43	When	the	peace	treaty	with	Japan	was	signed	in	1972	(sooner	than	 this	was	 not	 possible	 because	 the	 Japanese	 foreign	 and	defence	policy	was	closely	tied	to	that	of	the	US),	the	past	was	referred	to,	but	did	not	play	a	major	 role.	 The	 Joint	 Communiqué	 of	 the	 governments	 of	 Japan	 and	 China	acknowledged	 the	 Japanese	responsibility	 for	serious	damage	 inflicted	upon	China,	 and	 looked	 to	 the	 future,	 mentioning	 relations	 of	 peace	 and	friendship.44	Between	1979	and	2008,	Japan	spent	huge	sums	on	development	aid	to	China,	involving	 grant	 aid,	 loan	 aid,	 and	 technical	 cooperation.45	This	 gave	 Japan	political	leverage	in	potential	conflicts.	Yet	the	‘special	historical	background’	continued	to	play	a	role.	This	leverage	is	now	gone,	and	one	of	the	reasons	for	an	increasingly	tense	relation	between	Japan	and	China	is	that	the	economic	power	 of	 China	 –	 being	 very	 self-confident	 now	 –	 has	 risen	 tremendously.	Another	reason	is	the	growing	political	importance	of	nationalism.46	Since	 the	 reforms	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 by	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 in	 1978,	 the	communist	 ideology	 gradually	 lost	 its	 appeal.	 Economic	 reforms	 did	 not	necessarily	mean	also	political	 reform;	 this	was	made	very	 clear	during	 the	1989	 Tiananmen	 square	 protests,	 which	 were	 violently	 suppressed	 by	 the	military.	 As	 a	 result	 the	 CCP	 became	 increasingly	 dependent	 upon	nationalism.47		In	China,	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	strengthened	the	focus	on	the	Second	World	War	 experience.	 Its	 improved	 relations	 with	 the	 US	 coincided	 with	 an	increasingly	 critical	 attitude	 towards	 Japan.	 The	 stress	 has	 been	 placed	 on	victimhood	 and	 the	 atrocities	 Japan	 committed,	 which	 has	 in	 turn	strengthened	nationalism	in	Japan.	Though	there	are	certainly	issues	that	can	be	criticized,	it	is	not	true	that	the	Japanese	 as	 a	 whole	 have	 sanitized	 the	 past	 and	 failed	 to	 acknowledge	wartime	 aggression.	 For	 instance,	 Japan	 has	 repeatedly	 issued	 official	apologies.	Yet	 the	overall	 image	 is	not	uniform	because	of	ongoing	disputes	such	 as	 the	 visits	 of	 Prime	 Ministers	 Nakasone,	 Koizumi	 and	 Abe	 to	 the	Yasukuni	shrine,	where	souls	of	the	Japanese	war	dead,	including	prominent	war	 criminals,	 are	 enshrined,	 textbook	 issues,	 and	 problems	 regarding	
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acceptance	 of	 official	 responsibility	 towards	 the	 ianfy,	 the	 sexual	 ‘comfort	women’.			Historians	have	played	a	 contradictory	 role	here.	 Some	 Japanese	nationalist	historians,	 united	 in	 in	 the	 Japanese	 Society	 for	 History	 Textbook	 Reform	(Tsukurukai),	have	pleaded	for	textbooks	that	stressed	patriotic	values,	while	others	had	a	completely	opposed	view.48			I	turn	my	attention	to	Europe	now.		Looking	back,	one	might	say	that	Europe	immediately	tried	to	overcome	the	past	of	two	World	Wars	and	the	influence	of	two	totalitarian	systems.	In	the	European	 integration	project	 that	 started	with	 the	European	Coal	 and	 Steel	Community	in	1950,	it	was	explicitly	stated	that	cooperation	was	intended	to	prevent	 future	 war.	49	It	 was	 indeed	 highly	 remarkable	 how	 quickly	 France	and	Western	 Germany	 in	 particular	 came	 to	 terms	with	 one	 another	 again.	But	one	needs	also	to	look	toward	outside	intervention,	namely	the	American	pressure	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Organization	 for	 European	 Economic	Cooperation	(OEEC)	in	1948	to	implement	the	Marshall	Plan,	and	most	of	all	reduce	 trade	 barriers.	 Integration	 was	 first	 and	 foremost	 economic	integration,	 though	 deepening	 and	 enlargement	 in	 other	 areas	 gradually	followed	suit.			When	 the	 European	 Union	 was	 granted	 the	 Nobel	 Peace	 prize	 in	 2012,	President	Van	Rompuy	identified	its	‘secret	weapon’	as	‘an	unrivalled	way	of	binding	our	interests	so	tightly	that	war	becomes	materially	impossible’.50 Yet	this	is	not	the	only	story	to	tell	about	coming	to	grips	with	the	past.			Whilst	in	2005	Tony	Judt	could	write	that	‘the	recovered	memory	of	Europe’s	dead	 Jews	 has	 become	 the	 very	 definition	 and	 guarantee	 of	 the	 continent’s	restored	 humanity’,	 this	 was	 not	 always	 the	 case.51	Particularly	 in	 the	 first	decades	 after	 the	war,	 there	was	 a	 collective	 amnesia.	 In	 all	 the	 previously	German-occupied	 countries	 of	 Europe,	 the	 tendency	 was	 to	 block	 the	memory,	 for	 instance	with	regards	 to	 the	question	of	how	many	people	had	collaborated,	and	how	much,	and	to	move	on	instead.	In	France	(to	name	just	one	 example),	 it	 was	 only	 in	 1995	 that	 the	 reluctance	 to	 acknowledge	 the	collaboration	of	the	Vichy	regime	was	overcome	by	President	Chirac;	this	was	the	same	year	Queen	Beatrix	acknowledged	the	fate	of	the	Dutch	Jews	during	her	visit	to	Israel.			We	 now	 remember	 with	 fondness	 how	 the	 social	 democratic	 German	chancellor	Willy	 Brandt	 knelt	 in	Warsaw	 in	 1970,	 as	 an	 ultimate	 symbol	 of	atonement	 for	 the	 past,	 especially	 since	 he	 himself	 had	 been	 part	 of	 the	resistance	 against	 Nazism.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Der	 Spiegel	 reporter	Hermann	 Schreiber,	 Brandt	 knelt	 ‘for	 all	 who	 need	 to	 kneel	 but	 don’t	 –	because	 they	 dare	 not	 or	 cannot	 or	 cannot	 dare	 (…)	 Then	 he	 kneels	 for	Germany’.52	However,	here	the	picture	is	a	bit	misleading,	since	in	fact	this	act	was	hotly	 debated	 in	Germany	 at	 the	 time,	 as	was	Brandt’s	 ‘Ostpolitik’	 as	 a	whole.	 Actually	 Brandt	was	 in	Warsaw	 to	 sign	 a	 treaty	 that	 recognised	 the	
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Historians	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 countering	 myths	 about	 the	Second	World	War,	yet	they	did	not	necessarily	agree	amongst	themselves.	In	West	Germany,	the	so-called	Historikerstreit	comes	to	mind,	which	started	in	1986	as	a	dispute	 in	 the	public	sphere	between	 Jürgen	Habermas	and	Ernst	Nolte,	the	one	opposing	tendencies	to	‘historicise	the	past’,	by	putting	the	Nazi	atrocities	in	the	context	of	other	gruesome	deeds,	such	as	those	committed	by	Stalin	or	Pol	Pot,	 and	 the	other	opposing	politicisation	and	demonization	of	German	 history.	 The	 ensuing	 debate	was	 very	 political	 and	 ideological,	 and	ended	in	a	stalemate.59		After	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	and	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union,	there	seemed	to	be	a	strong	political	will	for	more	European	integration.	However,	the	 further	 development	 of	 the	 European	 project	 and	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	relatively	 poor	 Central	 Eastern	European	 countries	 proved	 to	 be	more	 so	 a	policy	 supported	 by	 the	 elite	 than	 by	 the	 average	 EU	 citizen.	 The	 financial	crisis	 of	 2008	 did	 not	 help	 either.	 Euroscepticism,	 which	 was	 always	potentially	 there,	 has	 obtained	 a	 serious	 boost	 during	 the	 last	 decade.	 As	China	made	Japan	its	evil	empire,	Europe	is	–	mostly	phrased	in	one-liners	–	identified	 as	 the	 new	 enemy	 of	 national	 identities.	 What	 is	 of	 particular	interest	here	is	that	historians	contributed	for	decades	to	paint	a	rosy	picture	of	developing	a	European	identity	and	spirit	by	stressing	commonalities,	and	by	 largely	 neglecting	 internal	 differences.	 This	 image	 is	 changing	 now,	 as	 a	result	 of	 an	 accumulation	 of	 crises.	 In	 particular,	 the	 crisis	 concerning	refugees	and	displaced	persons	has	fuelled	an	increase	in	nationalism.	It	also	has	 forced	 the	 old	 enemy,	 Germany,	 into	 a	 leading	 role,	 which	 has	 led	 to	mixed	feelings.			What	 we	 can	 observe	 now,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 Euroscepticism,	 particularly	predominant	among	rightist,	nationalist	parties,	is	that	Europe	does	not	seem	to	recognise	the	benefits	of	its	long-lasting	peace.			Though	the	EU	has	indeed	made	it	highly	unlikely	that	its	28	members	will	be	engaged	 in	 war	 amongst	 themselves,	 the	 nationalism	 that	 is	 developing	 at	present	 undermines	 European	 cohesion	 and	 solidarity.	 Eastern	 European	countries	are	on	a	collision	course,	which	poses	a	danger	for	internal	stability	in	the	member	states,	as	well	as	for	Europe	as	a	whole.	In	Europe,	we	see	once	more	 that	 history	 is	misused	 for	 nationalist	 aims.	Re-emerging	nationalistic	narratives	produce	a	lack	of	trust,	and	lead	to	the	radicalisation	of	groups	who	feel	 socially	 excluded.	 From	 having	 been	 a	 binding	 element,	 the	 EU	 has	instead	become	a	divisive	factor.				If	anyone	knows	well	the	dangers	which	nationalism,	racism,	xenophobia	and	populism	 present,	 it	 is	 historians.	 Historians	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 offer	 an	antidote,	 to	 correct	 images	 that	play	games	with	historical	 facts	 and	 reality.	This	does	justice	to	historical	truthfulness.			In	the	Euroculture	Master	programme,	we	have	taken	up	the	challenge	with	a	curriculum	 which	 recognises	 that	 Europe’s	 future	 is	 shaped	 not	 only	 by	economics	 and	 politics,	 but	 also	 by	 struggles	 over	 identities,	 values,	 and	
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heritage.	The	programme	highlights	 the	 vital	 interplay	between	 culture	 and	politics	in	European	society.		However,	 further	 steps	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 necessary.	 Therefore,	 one	month	ago,	I	submitted	an	application	on	behalf	of	the	Euroculture	Consortium	for	a	Marie	 Skłodowska	 Curie	 Joint	 Doctorate	 programme.	 Its	 objective	 is	 to	investigate	the	condition	of	and	need	for	societal	integration	in	Europe	today,	and	 devises	 qualitative	 strategies	 to	 strengthen	 collective	 confidence	 and	societal	 trust	 on	 different	 levels	 in	 Europe.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 cultural	dimensions	of	the	societal	integration	process.	The	project	foresees	positions	for	 15	 PhDs,	 who	 are	 not	 only	 expected	 to	 conduct	 high-level	 research	 on	pressing	political	and	cultural	 issues,	but	also	 to	engage	 in	public	debate	by	approaching	relevant	media	for	stimulating	dialogue	in	the	public	domain.			To	conclude:		In	this	lecture,	I	have	shown	that	in	both	East	Asia	and	in	Europe	it	has	taken	quite	 some	 time	 to	 discuss	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 war,	 and	 that	 taking	responsibility	and	recognise	one’s	own	role	has	not	been	easy.				Historians	have	indeed	played	the	role	of	‘remembrancer’,	but	my	own	view	is	that	 they	 should	 engage	 much	 more	 in	 the	 public	 debate,	 especially	 when	history	 is	 misused	 or	 misinterpreted.	 It	 certainly	 would	 not	 hurt	 the	development	of	a	fair	picture	if	the	reasons	for	and	background	of	European	integration,	 Europeanisation	 and	 democratisation	 would	 be	 contextualised	and	explained	better.		A	strong	emphasis	on	nationalism	is	dangerous.			I	would	like	to	conclude	by	mentioning	one	important	element	that	I	have	not	discussed	so	far,	but	which	nevertheless	 is	crucial.	 If	historians	need	to	play	the	role	of	 ‘remembrancer’,	 then	at	 least	 they	should	be	able	 to	execute	and	publish	 research	 independently.	 Nowadays,	 this	 freedom	 is	 not	 granted	everywhere.	I	return	to	the	book	with	which	I	started	this	lecture,	1984,	which	contains	a	perfect	description:	 ‘Freedom	is	 the	 freedom	to	say	two	plus	 two	make	four.	If	that	is	granted,	all	else	follows’.60		Ik	heb	gezegd.									 	
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